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Abstract 
Background: Decisions made by individuals with disordered gambling are markedly inflexible. However, whether 
anomalies in learning from feedback are gambling‑specific, or extend beyond gambling contexts, remains an open 
question. More generally, addictive disorders—including gambling disorder—have been proposed to be facilitated 
by individual differences in feedback‑driven decision‑making inflexibility, which has been studied in the lab with the 
Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task (PRLT). In this task, participants are first asked to learn which of two choice options 
is more advantageous, on the basis of trial‑by‑trial feedback, but, once preferences are established, reward contingen‑
cies are reversed, so that the advantageous option becomes disadvantageous and vice versa. Inflexibility is revealed 
by a less effective reacquisition of preferences after reversal, which can be distinguished from more generalized learn‑
ing deficits.
Methods: In the present study, we compared PRLT performance across two groups of 25 treatment‑seeking patients 
diagnosed with an addictive disorder and who reported gambling problems, and 25 matched controls [18 Males/7 
Females in both groups,  Mage(SDage) = 25.24 (8.42) and 24.96 (7.90), for patients and controls, respectively]. Beyond 
testing for differences in the shape of PRLT learning curves across groups, the specific effect of problematic gambling 
symptoms’ severity was also assessed independently of group assignment. In order to surpass previous methodologi‑
cal problems, full acquisition and reacquisition curves were fitted using generalized mixed‑effect models.
Results: Results showed that (1) controls did not significantly differ from patients in global PRLT performance nor 
showed specific signs of decision‑making inflexibility; and (2) regardless of whether group affiliation was controlled 
for or not, gambling severity was specifically associated with more inefficient learning in phases with reversed 
contingencies.
Conclusion: Decision‑making inflexibility, as revealed by difficulty to reacquire decisional preferences based on 
feedback after contingency reversals, seems to be associated with gambling problems, but not necessarily with a 
substance‑use disorder diagnosis. This result aligns with gambling disorder models in which domain‑general compul‑
sivity is linked to vulnerability to develop gambling‑specific problems with exposure to gambling opportunities.
Keywords: Addictive disorders, Gambling disorder, Gambling severity, Compulsivity, Learning inflexibility, 
Probabilistic reversal learning task
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Background
Balanced decision-making is crucial for adaptive daily 
functioning. Consequently, anomalies of decision-mak-
ing processes are present in a range of psychopathologi-
cal conditions [1–4]. In more direct relation to the aims 
of the present study, addiction has been described as a 
disorder of the ability to make good decisions, namely to 
make choices regarding the potentially addictive behavior 
(using drugs, gambling) that overcome impulses, for the 
sake of more beneficial long-term goals [5–7]. Individu-
als suffering from an addictive disorder thus persist in a 
harmful behavior in spite of its negative consequences 
(e.g. economic losses, health, family and work problems) 
(DSM-5 [8]). In concordance with this observation, a 
number of studies have tried to test the prediction that 
addicted patients present domain-general decision-
making alterations that could predate the disorder onset, 
contribute to its chronicity or complication, or occur as a 
consequence of the addictive process itself [9–11].
Among the aspects of decision making that are relevant 
to understand addictive processes is behavioral flexibility, 
namely the ability to readjust preferences in response to 
reward contingency changes in decision-making-under-
ambiguity tasks. Inflexibility would be manifested in a 
transient inability to stop choosing a given option that is 
no longer advantageous (perseveration), or, more gener-
ally, in a difficulty to relearn action-outcome contingen-
cies that depart from the ones that were learnt in the 
initial acquisition phase.
The relevance of decision-making inflexibility for 
addictive behaviors stems from the fact that it is hypoth-
esized to reflect domain-general proneness to compul-
sivity [12, 13], which, in turn, has been theorized to be 
a transdiagnostic vulnerability factor for addictive dis-
orders and other psychopathologies [14, 15]. In different 
theories, (a) addictive behaviors transition from being 
goal-driven to being stimuli or context-driven (habitual/
compulsive, [16, 17]), or, alternatively, (b) addiction-
related rewards acquire a disproportionate motivational 
value [18]. Independently of which of these approaches is 
correct, it seems obvious that being unable to fine-tune 
the associations between decision options and outcomes, 
or to behave accordingly, would render the individual 
more vulnerable to the progression of loss of control over 
potentially addictive behaviors.
There are several ways to operationalize decision-
making inflexibility in the laboratory [19, 20]. However, 
none of the available protocols is sensitive only to inflex-
ibility. Crucially, reacquisition after contingency change 
is inextricably linked to more general contingency learn-
ing differences, i.e. any individual differences in acquisi-
tion will contaminate gross reacquisition differences. So, 
detecting inflexibility previously requires experimentally 
dissociating acquisition learning and artifact-free (in)
flexibility (for a detailed discussion on this matter and its 
methodological subtleties, see [21]).
This distinction is not only of methodological impor-
tance. There is some consensus that acquisition learning 
is computationally simpler than adjustment to unsig-
naled contingency changes. Extinction, for instance, is 
not just the vanishment of previous conditioning, but a 
context-dependent learning process about the omission 
of the reinforcer [22]. Similarly, reversal learning seems 
to require high-order mechanisms to restructure the set 
of learned associations (for an updated view, see [23]). 
So, once the dissociation is granted, computational mod-
elling is required to identify the cognitive processes origi-
nating the two parts of such a dissociation [21]. Although 
the present study concerns only the first stage of this pro-
cess, the constraints it imposes on computational model-
ling will be sketched in the discussion section.
The probabilistic learning task and problematic gambling
The most pervasively used task to investigate decision-
making inflexibility in the lab is the Probabilistic Rever-
sal Learning Task (henceforth, PRLT). In each trial of 
this task, two choice options are presented to the learner, 
one advantageous (more likely to ensue reward; e.g. vir-
tual points or money), and the other disadvantageous 
(more likely to ensue some kind of punishment). Ini-
tially, the individual has no other possibility than mak-
ing her decision at random, but her choices grow attuned 
to reward and punishment contingencies as the task 
progresses. However, at some point, and without prior 
notice, the contingencies are reversed, and the individual 
needs to update her preferences on the basis of the new 
contingencies.
As noted above, decision-making inflexibility can be 
used as an individual-differences measure of compul-
sivity [24, 25]. Unfortunately, most previous attempts 
to compare PRLT performance across groups of indi-
viduals with and without addictive behaviors are not 
free of methodological and interpretational problems. 
In general, there is no unanimity regarding the best way 
to measure inflexibility in the PRLT. In a recent meta-
analysis and systematic review, van Timmeren et al. [19], 
found that the studies that used the PRLT do not reveal 
significant levels of behavioral inflexibility in individuals 
with gambling disorder. However, this could be due to 
the diversity of procedures and measures used to opera-
tionalize PRLT performance. Different studies used, for 
instance, the amount of money or points earned [26, 27], 
the number of correct choices [28–30] or the number of 
consecutive errors after each reversion (i.e. perseverative 
errors, [31, 32]).
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In the present work, we will follow Perandrés-Gómez 
et  al.’s [21] approach to analyze full acquisition and re-
acquisition curves in a PRLT with four phases: one in 
which preferences are first established, and three more 
resulting from two contingency reversals [33]. The first 
aim was to determine whether group affiliation (patients 
with a substance use disorder with symptoms of comor-
bid problematic gambling vs healthy controls) has any 
effect on the form of learning curves in each phase, or 
their variation across phases. Inflexibility can be cor-
roborated by detecting any reacquisition disadvantage in 
phases with reversed contingencies (2 and 4), relative the 
ones with contingencies in the original direction (1 and 
3) that is experimentally dissociable from global differ-
ences in task performance (e.g. phase-independent learn-
ing rates or asymptotes). More importantly, we will test 
whether the effect of contingency reversal depends itself 
on group (i.e. whether patients show more signs of deci-
sion-making inflexibility than controls). Subsequently, we 
will specifically analyze participants’ performance in rela-
tion to the severity of their problematic gambling symp-
toms, regardless of (or controlling for) group affiliation. 
By assessing the relationship between gambling sever-
ity and PRLT performance, independently of group, we 
intended to dissociate the effect of problematic gambling 
from the one of other addictive behaviors.
Decision-making inflexibility in reversed contingency 
phases of the PRLT has been previously reported to be 
associated with disordered gambling [21, 29]. This prone-
ness towards compulsivity would explain to some extent 
the easiness with which disordered gamblers adhere to 
an initially favorable reinforcement contingency, but are 
later incapable of abandoning it [34–36]. Therefore, from 
this perspective, PRLT inflexibility would be expected 
to be linked to higher severity of disordered gambling 




Twenty-five patients under treatment for an addic-
tive disorder were recruited from the centers Centro de 
Recuperación Nueva Luz and Centro de Recuperación 
Integral de Alcoholismo y Drogadicción (CRIAD), from 
Guayaquil, Ecuador. Convenience sampling was used to 
recruit 25 healthy controls, as closely matched as possi-
ble with patients on relevant covariates. Some of the con-
trol participants were contacted using announcements in 
the School of Psychology of the University of Guayaquil, 
and others were recruited among acquaintances of the 
patients.
All patients were under treatment for at least one 
addictive disorder (most of them, for alcohol use 
disorder), and were diagnosed with the DSM-IV-TR 
diagnostic criteria. The inclusion criteria for both groups 
were: (1) being between 18 and 65 years old, and (2) no 
history of head trauma or neurological problems, and 
not to be diagnosed with any psychiatric or psychological 
disorder (apart from the addictive disorder in the group 
of patients). Patients were included in the sample and 
considered for further assessments and analyses only if 
they informed of a previous history of significant prob-
lems as a consequence of gambling. Severity of gambling 
symptoms was assessed with the South Oaks Gambling 
Screen (SOGS, Spanish version; [37]). Nineteen of the 
25 patients actually scored above the SOGS threshold 
for gambling disorder. The 6 patients who informed to 
have suffered gambling problems in the past but did not 
meet the criteria for current gambling disorder were kept 
in the study sample. The sociodemographic and clinical 
profile of each group is reported in Table 1.
Procedure
Each participant was assessed in a single session last-
ing ~ 2  h. Patients were assessed in the rehabilitation 
clinics, and control participants in the premises of the 
School of Psychology of the University of Guayaquil. 
All the assessments were performed by an Ecuadorian 
clinical psychologist with a master’s degree in neuro-
science. The assessment protocol was divided into four 
blocks (cognitive tests, computer tasks, paper-and-
pencil emotion and personality tests, and a clinical 
interview). The order of blocks and tasks within each 
block were counterbalanced for all participants. The 
instruments used were the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Adults-III (WAIS-III: vocabulary and matrices 
Table 1 Sociodemographic and  clinical features: means, 
standard deviations, and  Bayes factors, expressing 
support for the alternative hypothesis
HC, healthy controls; SOGS, South Oaks Gambling Screen
Group Mean SD BF10
Age HC 24.96 7.908 0.303
Patients 25.24 8.428
Education HC 14.33 3.131 4.52
Patients 12.36 2.307
Income HC 4.21 1.607 0.317
Patients 4.04 1.695
SOGS HC 0.44 1.08 106,137
Patients 7.72 4.61
Alcohol misuse HC 0.12 0.18 1274
Patients 0.63 0.34
Drug misuse HC 0.02 0.10 66,121
Patients 0.77 0.25
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[38]), an impulsive behavior scale (UPPS-P [39]), the 
Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward 
Questionnaire (SPSRQ-20 [40]), the South Oaks Gam-
bling Screen (SOGS [38]), the MultiCAGE [41], and 
the Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task (PRLT [28]). 
Some of these were however not relevant for the pur-
poses of this study and will not be described here (see 
[42]; there is an overlap of 12.6% between samples of 
both studies).
Instruments
The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS, Spanish ver-
sion; [37]) was originally based on DSM-III-R diagnos-
tic criteria for pathological gambling, but it has been 
later shown to have good convergence with DSM-IV-
TR and DSM-5 [43]. The clinical threshold for gam-
bling disorder has been established at mean score ≥ 5. 
The Spanish version of this instrument has shown good 
psychometric properties (Cronbach’s α = 0.94 [37]).
Alcohol and drug misuse were assessed with the 
eight dichotomous alcohol and drug-related items of 
the MultiCAGE questionnaire (Spanish version; [41]). 
The Spanish version of this questionnaire has shown 
good internal consistency as measured by Cronbach’s α 
(i.e. all scales presented scores higher than 0.70 [41]). 
Risk of alcohol misuse was computed as the average 
response for the 4 alcohol-related items (0–1), and risk 
of drug misuse as the average for the 4 drug-related 
items (0–1) of the scale. For the two sub-scales, the 
threshold for significant risk of misuse has been estab-
lished at two positive responses (mean score ≥ 0.5) [41].
The Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task (PRLT, [28]), 
is a computer-based decision-making task, in which the 
participants have to choose, in each trial, between two 
different stimuli (by mouse-clicking on one of them). 
The options consist of two squares of different colors, 
randomly shifting their positions. The task consists of 
four phases with 40 trials each. Within each phase, one 
of the options was “correct” and, when the participant 
chose it, a symbolic reward was given in most occa-
sions (probabilistically). The other option was “incor-
rect”, and the participant was notified of the error after 
choosing it. Participants were rewarded with virtual 
points, and punished by subtracting points from their 
account. In this way, phases 1 and 3 were phases with 
the original contingency sign, and 2 and 4 as phases 
with reversed contingencies. In phases 1 and 2, the pro-
portion of true/false feedback was 80/20%, whereas in 
Phases 3 and 4 was 70/30%. This degradation of con-
tingency was introduced to increase uncertainty and 
thus to avoid close-to-perfect performance in the late 
phases of the task.
Statistical analyses
The two groups (patients and controls) were first com-
pared in relevant sociodemographics and clinical features 
using Bayesian Mann–Whitney tests, with default priors 
as implemented in open JASP software.
PRLT performance was coded trialwise. Each response 
in each trial was classified as correct (R = 1) if the colored 
square with the higher probability of reward (in the ongo-
ing phase) was chosen, and incorrect (R = 0) if the color 
with the lower probability of reward was chosen.
The first PRLT analysis obeyed to a Phase (1, 2, 
3, 4) × Trial (1–40) × Group (HC, Patients) design. 
Response was modeled as a binomial variable with a 
logit link, using Generalized Linear Mixed-effects Mod-
els (GLME), with the glmer function implemented in the 
lme4 R software package [44]. This analysis is concep-
tually similar to a logistic regression, but includes both 
random and fixed-effects factors. In the present case, 
Phase and Trial were used as within-participant fixed 
factors, and Group as a between-participant fixed factor. 
Participant was considered as a random-effects factor, 
and Trial also as a random slope at the participant level 
(trial|participant). Additionally, in order to reduce the 
number of parameters in the model, Trial was treated as 
a quantitative variable, and was (natural)log-transformed 
in order to incorporate into the models the general prin-
ciple that acquisition processes are curvilinear (in rela-
tion to Trial), and can thus be modelled as approximately 
linear in relation to Log-trial. Log-trial was zero-centered 
with the standard deviation as unit (so Log-trial was 
expressed in a − 3.16 to 1.07 scale). Standardization is 
just a linear transformation of the original variable, and 
is generally recommended for quantitative predictors in 
this type of models to prevent convergence problems. For 
presentation purposes, the scale in all figures was resti-
tuted to the 1–40 scale.
Main effects in this analysis were thus the ones of Log-
trial, Phase, and Group, and the interactions among 
them. The effect of Phase was decomposed into three 
orthogonal contrasts [C1 (− 1, − 1, 1, 1), C2 (1, − 1, 
1, − 1), and C3 (− 1, 1, 1, − 1)]. The contrast portray-
ing evidence regarding learning inflexibility is C2, as it 
represents the differential performance in phases with 
reversed-sign contingencies (2nd and 4th), relative to 
phases with the original contingency sign (1st and 3rd). 
Global learning differences are however portrayed by 
Group and Group × Log-trial main effects.
In order to isolate the contribution of each main effect 
to model fitting, a saturated model was first fitted. This 
was contrasted against a simplified one without the 
Phase × Log-trial × Group interaction, using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and a likelihood ratio test. 
If the simplified model did not lose fit, it was established 
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as the reference model for further comparisons, and was 
further simplified by removing the two-way interac-
tions one by one. The same procedure was repeated with 
marginal effects (Phase, Log-trial, and Group, with the 
restriction that a marginal effect cannot be removed if it 
is involved in any of the interactions left in the model in 
previous steps). Once the best-fitting model was identi-
fied, significance of each of the effects in the model was 
determined using the z statistic, with a p < 0.05 signifi-
cance level.
A second analysis was aimed at assessing the contribu-
tion of SOGS gambling severity to PRLT (both regardless 
and controlling for group affiliation). A similar back-
wards hierarchical model fitting procedure was followed, 
but including SOGS Severity as an individual differences 
factor (instead of, or along with Group).
Results
Preliminary analyses
Each group consisted of 18 males and 7 females. Educa-
tion years and Income were not available for one partici-
pant, and those two missing data points were imputed 
using group means. Mean and standard deviation for 
each group in Age, Education years, and the Monthly 
income scale are shown in Table 1.
Bayes factors (for the Mann–Whitney U test) yielded 
support for the alternative hypothesis  (BF10 > 3) for Edu-
cation years, and for the null  (BF10 < 1/3) for Age and 
Monthly income. In other words, the two groups were 
well matched in Age and Monthly income, but differed 
in Education years. The same analyses were performed 
for the SOGS, MultiCAGE drugs, and MultiCAGE alco-
hol. As expected, given the group sampling procedure, 
patients were, on average, well above the clinical thresh-
old in the three scales, whereas controls scored clearly 
within the non-problematic range. Complementarily, 
neither Monthly income (r = − 0.073,  BF10 = 0.201), nor 
Education years (r = − 0.194,  BF10 = 0.429) substantially 
correlated with SOGS severity across groups.
Before proceeding to the main analyses, we also 
checked whether log-transforming trial number within 
phase served the aim of adequately capturing the hypo-
thetical curvilinear shape of the learning function (i.e. the 
learning process underlying the probability of a correct 
choice is a linear function of Log-trial), and the shape 
restrictions imposed by this assumption are not as tight 
as to not allowing to capture variations of learning curves 
across levels of the other factors. With that aim in mind, 
three baseline models were compared (identical to the 
ones described in the statistical analyses section, except 
for the non-inclusion of Group, and how Trial was mod-
elled). In the first one (linear), trial was not transformed; 
in the second one (logarithmic) trial was (natural)
log-transformed before entering the model; and in the 
third one (polynomial) the effect of trial was decom-
posed into a quadratic and linear component. Both the 
logarithmic and the polynomial model clearly outper-
formed the linear one (AIC = 10,509, 10,492, and 10,505, 
for the three models, respectively), which indicates that 
the learning process is better conceptualized as curvilin-
ear function of trial. However, despite being more flex-
ible (having less shape restrictions and thus being able to 
capture a broader range of curves) the polynomial model 
was outperformed by the logarithmic model. Or, what 
amounts to be the same, the increase in explained vari-
ance does not compensate the increase in complexity of 
the polynomial model (13 vs 9 parameters).1
Between‑groups differences in PRLT performance
Table 2 shows results for the hierarchical GLME analysis. 
Removing the three-way interaction from the saturated 
model (Model 0.a vs Model 1) did not hamper model 
fit. Removing the Group × Phase interaction or the 
Group × Trail interaction did not affect model fit either 
(Model 2.1 and 2.3 vs Model 1). However, removing the 
Phase × Log-trial interaction from Model 1 (Model 2.2 vs 
Model 1) did hamper model fit, so that two-way interac-
tion was retained. Further removal of Group from Model 
2.4 did not hamper model fit either, so the final, best-
fitting model (Model 3) did not contain any marginal or 
interactive effect of Group.
Table  3 presents estimates for all effects (OR, odds 
ratios) in models 1 and 3, along with their confidence 
intervals and significance levels, resulting from running 
the models. The directions of these effects are shown in 
Fig. 1. Predicted values from the saturated model show, 
that, as expected, the proportion of correct responses 
increased with Log-trial within phases; and, second, 
that performance in reversed phases decreased relative 
to acquisition-sign-contingency phases, regardless of 
Group. There was no significant evidence that patients 
made fewer correct choices in general, or in phases with 
reversed contingencies relative to non-reversed ones 
(and so the absence of Group marginal or interactive 
effects in the best-fitting model, and particularly of inter-
actions involving Group × C2).
PRLT performance as a function of SOGS gambling severity
The patients group consisted of individuals receiving 
treatment for substance use disorders who also pre-
sented gambling problems. So, in order to test gambling 
1 The capacity of the log-transformation of the Trial scale to capture the shape 
of learning functions is visually corroborated by the close correspondence 
between Figs.  1 and 2 (predicted scores from fitted models) and Additional 
file 1: Figures S1 and S2 (observed scores).
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problems in a more specific way, the impact of SOGS 
gambling severity on PRLT was analyzed. We did so by 
including SOGS score as a continuous predictor, along 
with its interactions with Phase and Trial, in the best-fit-
ting model from the previous analyses, and reached the 
best-fitting model following the hierarchical procedure 
described earlier (Table  4, left panel). Although Group 
did not have any marginal or interactive effects in previ-
ous analysis, for the sake of robustness, effects were also 
estimated for SOGS effects while controlling for Group 
and Group × Phase (i.e. Group-related effects that could 
explain SOGS and SOGS × Phase effects away; Table  4, 
right panel).
Interestingly, SOGS interaction with Phase involved 
only contrast C2 (see Table 5), namely the one reflect-
ing learning inflexibility (reacquisition during phases 
with reversed contingencies, relative to the one in 
phases with the original contingency sign). The C2 con-
trast is significant in all models considered so far, i.e. 
learning is poorer in reversed contingency phases than 
in non-reversed ones. However, this pattern was more 
intense in high-SOGS individuals. As can be seen in 
Fig.  2, high-SOGS individuals showed a more intense 
drop in the probability of making a correct choice in 
Phase 2 relative to Phase 1, and in Phase 4 relative to 
Phase 3, if compared with low-SOGS.
Discussion
The first aim of the present study was to test the exist-
ence of PRLT differences, and, more specifically, signs 
of decision-making inflexibility, in a group of patients 
with addictive disorders and gambling problems, 
Fig. 1 Predicted values (and confidence intervals) from the saturated model in Table 2, for controls (HC) and patients, across Phase and Log‑trial. 
The vertical axis represents the predicted probability of a correct choice
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relative to matched controls. As depicted in Fig.  1 
(see Additional file  1: Figure S1 for a depiction of 
observed, instead of predicted, responses), although 
patients showed less steep within-phase learning func-
tions, between-group differences did not reach signifi-
cance.2 There were no specific learning efficiency drops 
either in phases with reversed contingencies (phases 
2 and 4), relative to non-reversed ones (phases 1 and 
3). Some studies have found that addiction may have a 
generalized deleterious effect on feedback-based deci-
sion-making [27, 28], but this does not make learning 
necessarily more inflexible.
Results were contrastingly different when PRLT perfor-
mance was analyzed as a function of gambling severity 
(measured with the SOGS questionnaire). As shown in 
Fig. 2 (and Additional file 1: Figure S2), participants with 
stronger disordered gambling symptoms made substan-
tially fewer correct choices in phases 2 and 4, relative to 
phases 1 and 3, regardless of group. Or, more precisely, 
the more severe gambling was, the more marked this 
pattern grew. This result also aligns with the ones from 
the study by Torres et al. [29], in which gambling inten-
sity (monthly use) was associated with increased rever-
sal costs, restricted to reversed-contingency phases, and, 
especially, with Perandrés-Gómez et  al.’s, [21] in which 
patients with gambling disorder were found to behave 
more inflexibly in the PRLT, independently of drug use. 
To our knowledge, the only study in which this pattern 
has been reported in patients with substance use disor-
ders is the one by Moreno-López et al. [28], where rever-
sal learning deficits were observed to be associated with 
Fig. 2 Predicted values (and prediction confidence intervals) for all Phase × Block conditions in the PRLT, for low and high SOGS level, from the 
saturated model in Table 4. SOGS reference values were automatically selected as high (+ 1 SD), and low (− 1 SD)
2 This lack of significance is however likely to be due low power. Alternative 
analyses without the Log-trial random slope, presented in the first section of 
the Supplementary materials, yielded a significant Group × Log-trial effect. 
This effect originated in the generally slower learning functions in all Phases 
for the Patients group.
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Table 2 Model selection for PRLT performance in the two-groups sample
Significant p values are in italics
a Best fitting model
b Almost singular fit (given the risk of overfitting, parameters will be estimated both for Model 1 and Model 3) (Although singular models are statistically well 
defined, singular fits may correspond to overfitted models with low power, and inferential procedures such as likelihood ratio tests may be inappropriate. In our 
case, singularity is due to the inclusion of Log‑trial as a random slope in the model. Although it is theoretically sensible to assume that there are random individual 
differences in learning rates across participants, random slopes are not necessary to capture statistical dependency between repeated measures and thus to properly 
estimate within‑participant effects. In view of that, and for the sake of consistency, alternative analyses without random slopes in the models are provided in the 
Additional file)
Sat Saturated
Model Fixed factors df AIC χ2 p
Sat. (0.a) Group, Phase, Log‑trial, 2‑way interactions, 3‑way interaction 19 10,422
1 Saturated minus 3‑way interaction 16 10,419 2.418 0.490
(1 ≥ 0.a)
2.1 Model 1 minus Group × Log‑trial 15 10,418 1.418 0.227
(2.1 ≥ 1)
2.2b Model 1 minus Phase × Log‑trial 13 10,432 18.978  < 0.001
(1 > 2.2)
2.3 Model 1 minus Phase × Group 13 10,418 4.973 0.174
(2.3 ≥ 1)
2.4 Model 1 minus Group × Log‑trial and Phase × Group 12 10,417
3a Model 2.4 minus Group 11 10,416 0.592 0.459
(3 ≥ 2.4)
Table 3 Effect estimates for Model 1 and the best-fitting model (Model 3) of correct choices in the PRLT
Significant p values are in italics
Predictors Model 1 Best‑fitting model
OR CI p OR CI p
Intercept 1.62 1.39–1.89  < 0.001 1.50 1.35–1.68  < 0.001
Log‑trial 1.24 1.11–1.38  < 0.001 1.18 1.09–1.28  < 0.001
Phase C1 0.88 0.82–0.94  < 0.001 0.86 0.82–0.90  < 0.001
Phase C2 0.81 0.76–0.87  < 0.001 0.79 0.76–0.83  < 0.001
Phase C3 0.93 0.87–0.99 0.021 0.96 0.92–1.01 0.082
Group 0.86 0.69–1.07 0.165
C1 × Log‑trial 0.97 0.92–1.01 0.153 0.97 0.92–1.01 0.153
C2 × Log‑trial 1.04 1.00–1.09 0.077 1.04 1.00–1.09 0.078
C3 × Log‑trial 1.09 1.04–1.14  < 0.001 1.09 1.04–1.14  < 0.001
Group × Log‑trial 0.91 0.78–1.06 0.224
C1 × Group 0.95 0.87–1.05 0.326
C2 × Group 0.95 0.86–1.04 0.232
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cocaine use severity and diminished cerebellar gray mat-
ter volume.
In summary, according to our results, restricted effects 
on reversal deficits (namely, specific difficulties in learn-
ing reversed contingencies), can arise independently of 
differences in general learning deficiencies in the PRLT. 
As shown here, only the former seem to be associated 
with degrees of gambling severity; value updating of 
choice options seems to be more hindered in more severe 
gamblers.
Beyond this effect, this work also presents some meth-
odological advances. So far, PRLT performance had been 
assessed either by extracting summary performance indi-
ces (e.g. number of perseverative errors; [30, 31]) or ana-
lyzing learning curves in a blockwise fashion (number of 
correct responses per 5-trial or 10-trial block: [28, 29]). 
These summary parameters, however, present interpreta-
tion problems. For instance, individuals reaching higher 
learning asymptotes in the preceding phase tend to per-
form transitorily worse in the first trials of the ongoing 
phase. This means that assessing decision-making inflex-
ibility by means of perseverative errors is likely to con-
found ‘true’ and ‘apparent’ perseverative errors, with 
the latter being attributable to pre-reversal differences. 
Blockwise analyses, in turn, are likely to be insensitive to 
effects that occur in the trial-by-trial scale. Moreover, our 
trialwise analyses of responses allows to model them as 
they really are, dichotomous (0/1) responses, instead of 
response counts (number of perseverative errors, num-
ber of correct choices per block) with distributional fea-
tures that are seldomly taken into account in standard, 
general linear model-based analyses.
Taken together, results fit well in the Gambling Space 
Model formulated by Navas et al. [45] (see also [42, 46]). 
In this model, articulated as a development of the semi-
nal Pathways Model [47], transition from recreational to 
Table 5 Effect estimates for  saturated (0.c) 1 and  best-fitting models (7.1) of  correct choices in  the  PRLT (controlling 
for Group)
Significant p values are in italics
Fixed effects Saturated model Best‑fitting model
OR CI p OR CI p
Intercept 1.49 1.27–1.74  < 0.001 1.49 1.27–1.74  < 0.001
Log‑trial 1.18 1.09–1.28  < 0.001 1.18 1.09–1.28  < 0.001
Phase C1 0.85 0.79–0.93  < 0.001 0.85 0.79–0.93  < 0.001
Phase C2 0.77 0.70–0.83  < 0.001 0.77 0.70–0.83  < 0.001
Phase C3 0.89 0.82–0.97 0.007 0.89 0.82–0.97 0.007
Group 1.02 0.82–1.27 0.849 1.02 0.82–1.27 0.849
SOGS 0.92 0.80–1.05 0.234 0.95 0.85–1.06 0.363
Log‑trial × C1 0.97 0.92–1.01 0.158 0.97 0.92–1.01 0.153
Log‑trial × C2 1.04 1.00–1.09 0.075 1.04 1.00–1.09 0.075
Log‑trial × C3 1.09 1.04–1.14  < 0.001 1.09 1.04–1.14  < 0.001
Group × C1 1.01 0.88–1.16 0.870 1.01 0.88–1.16 0.869
Group × C2 1.07 0.93–1.23 0.337 1.07 0.93–1.23 0.342
Group × C3 1.16 1.01–1.33 0.039 1.16 1.01–1.33 0.039
Log‑trial × SOGS 0.97 0.90–1.05 0.440
SOGS × C1 0.96 0.90–1.03 0.258 0.96 0.90–1.03 0.261
SOGS × C2 0.92 0.86–0.99 0.019 0.92 0.86–0.99 0.018
SOGS × C3 0.95 0.89–1.02 0.160 0.95 0.89–1.02 0.163
Log‑trial × SOGS × C1 0.99 0.95–1.04 0.776
Log‑trial × SOGS × C2 1.04 0.99–1.09 0.119
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disordered gambling is driven by the kind of reinforce-
ment schedules that have been experimentally shown to 
also facilitate transition from goal-driven to compulsive 
behaviors. This transition towards ‘gambling-specific’ 
compulsivity can be speeded or made more likely in vul-
nerable individuals showing trait-like signs of compulsiv-
ity (as also shown by animal translational research; [48]). 
In view that in gambling disorder there is no chemical 
agent to hijack reinforcement circuits, individual differ-
ences in compulsivity proneness could play a larger role 
than in substance use disorders. Tentatively, this could 
explain why signs of compulsivity are easier to detect in 
patients with gambling disorder than in other popula-
tions of addicted individuals, and also why, in the present 
study, decision-making inflexibility did not emerge in 
the between-group comparison, but did when gambling 
severity was specifically taken into consideration.
As noted in the introduction, modelling inflexibil-
ity in computational terms is beyond our current aims. 
However, inflexibility, as operationalized here, arises 
as a behavioral pattern these models must be able to 
accommodate. For instance, the experience-weighted 
attraction model [EWA; 49, 50], includes an experi-
ence weight parameter (ρ) to capture the well-known 
fact that updating becomes slower as experience accu-
mulates. Our finding that high-SOGS individuals are 
more prone to persevere in the phase of negative feed-
back (during reversed phases) is likely to be accounted 
for by an increased experience decay factor, as opposed 
to more aspects of reward learning (i.e. learning rate, 
α). Alternatively, our and Perandrés-Gómez et  al.’s [21] 
results may be explained by differences in more complex 
(sequential) exploratory behavior as captured by another 
recent model [VSE; 51]. An example of how param-
eters included in computational models, estimated from 
behavior in decision-making-under-ambiguity tasks (i.e. 
the Iowa Gambling Task), can be used as individual dif-
ferences variables to predict clinically-relevant gambling 
behavior can be found in a recent work by Kildahl et al. 
[52].
Limitations and final remarks
The present work is not free of limitations. First, con-
venience sampling did not allow carrying out an a priori 
power analysis. Although taking all observations into 
account increases power (relative to, for example, block-
wise analyses), 25 participants per group are probably 
still insufficient to reach adequate power for all relevant 
effects.
Second, the cross-sectional nature of the study does 
not allow either to make strong claims about causal 
directionality. More specifically, the fact that inflex-
ibility is associated with gambling severity is no direct 
proof that gambling severity and inflexibility are caus-
ally related in one way or the other.
And third, and relatedly, controlling for group (that 
is, for the diagnosis of a substance use disorder) when 
testing SOGS-inflexibility association does not stand 
as a strong control of other potentially relevant vari-
ables as, for example, cognitive deterioration or drug 
use beyond the established diagnosis. Although Mul-
tiCAGE measures are available for all participants, this 
questionnaire is a screening test, and thus not adequate 
as a continuous measure of addiction severity.
In summary, the evidential value of the present find-
ings must be assessed in combination with previously 
reported signs of proneness to learning inflexibility 
(i.e. domain-general compulsivity) in patients with 
disordered gambling. Seemingly, inconsistency in pre-
vious research can be attributed to differences in the 
way in which learning inflexibility in the Probabilis-
tic Reversal Learning Task (PRLT) is operationalized. 
In the present study, we adopted a mostly-data driven 
approach to identify specific signs of learning inflexibil-
ity (anomalies restricted to reacquisition in phases with 
a reversed contingency sign). Only patients with more 
severe symptoms of problematic gambling showed spe-
cific signs of learning inflexibility. These results align 
with gambling disorder models in which domain-gen-
eral compulsivity is linked to vulnerability to develop 
gambling-specific problems with exposure to gambling 
opportunities.
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